Since then, the High Court has handed down its judgment in R (Thompson & Carlo) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2026] EWHC 915 (Admin) ("Thompson"), providing important judicial clarification on the lawfulness of LFR deployment in England and Wales.
Overview of the case
As discussed in our earlier article, the focus of the Thompson claim was not about whether facial recognition is inherently lawful. Instead, it focused on the more nuanced (but critical) issue around whether the governance framework around LFR use in policing was sufficiently clear and constrained to comply with human rights law.
The claimants argued that the Metropolitan Police’s 2024 LFR policy gave officers too much discretion, particularly around where the technology could be deployed, why it could be used, and who could be included on watchlists.
This, they said, created a risk of arbitrary or unpredictable surveillance, contrary to Articles 8, 10, and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
The High Court’s judgment
In a unanimous decision, the Divisional Court dismissed the claim. The Court held that the Met’s policy does meet the required “quality of law” standard—meaning it is sufficiently clear, foreseeable and constrained to justify interferences with human rights.
Importantly, the Court accepted that:
- LFR does interfere with privacy rights, and can affect freedom of expression and assembly;
- But those interferences are lawful and justified, given the safeguards in place.
The Metropolitan Police succeeded largely because its revised framework was found by the Court to have addressed the key failings identified in earlier case law, most notably R (Bridges) v South Wales Police ("Bridges").
The claimants argued that the policy gave the Met a broad discretion, particularly in determining where LFR could be deployed and who could be included on watchlists. The Court rejected this argument. It emphasised that discretion is not inherently problematic; rather, the key question is whether it is sufficiently structured and constrained to guard against arbitrariness, such as decision-making based on whim, caprice or improper considerations.
On the facts, the Court found that the Met’s policy contained adequate safeguards and structure. LFR deployments were limited to three defined “Use Cases”, including crime hotspots, protective security operations, and situations involving specific intelligence relating to serious offences, and could not lawfully take place outside those categories. They found that the Met's policy, read as a whole, contained interlocking and cumulative constraints surrounding the the use of LFR.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court’s reasoning is consistent with, and builds upon, earlier authority on surveillance and data collection, signalling a continued judicial willingness to accept the use of novel technologies where supported by clear policy frameworks and oversight mechanisms.
What the judgment means
For policing and public authorities, this provides clearer judicial guidance on how to deploy AI tools such as LFR lawfully, with a focus on:
- defined specific use cases;
- limited discretion through structured decision-making;
- implementation of clear targeting criteria; and
- embedded documented proportionality assessments.
More broadly, the judgment reinforces a key principle highlighted in our earlier article (Policing at the AI Frontier: Face it - facial recognition is here to stay | DWF) that the lawfulness of emerging technologies like LFR is not determined solely by their technical capabilities, but by the robustness of the governance frameworks that underpin them. The Court’s analysis places considerable weight on the existence of clear policies, defined use cases and safeguards against arbitrary decision-making.
The case also highlights the importance for public authorities of keeping such policies under regular review as both the technology and its societal impact evolve.
Thompson v Carlo marks another step in the legal system’s attempt to keep pace with rapidly evolving AI-driven technologies. The message from the High Court is clear, that innovation will be permitted, but only where it is accompanied by rigorous and demonstrable safeguards.
Please get in touch with the team below if you would like to discuss any of the issues raised in this article.
Thank you to Rachel Jones, Jenny Leonard, Gabriella Rasiah and Natalie Parnaby for their contribution in producing this article.
