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Weak claims and dormant proceedings: Dismissal strategies in Irish professional negligence cases

19 November 2026

Two recent Irish High Court decisions highlight the different considerations for solicitors and their insurers when seeking early dismissal of professional negligence proceedings.

One concerned whether a claim could properly be struck out at a preliminary stage; the other whether prolonged inactivity justified dismissal for want of prosecution.

In Kerr v Moran [2026] IEHC 620 the High Court refused to strike out a solicitors’ negligence claim despite what the judge described as the “obvious frailties” in the plaintiffs’ case because the application depended on disputed facts that could not properly be resolved on affidavit evidence.

By contrast, in Doran v Quinn and Brady [2026] IEHC 660 the High Court dismissed a professional negligence claim following more than five years and eight months of complete inactivity. Applying Kirwan v Connors, the court held that the delay was sufficiently serious to justify dismissal.

Taken together, the decisions illustrate an important strategic distinction: weakness in the underlying claim may not be enough to secure summary dismissal where material facts remain disputed, whereas prolonged and unexplained inactivity may provide a separate basis for bringing proceedings to an end.

Kerr v Moran: An apparently weak claim survives

The claim

The proceedings arose from the purchase of an investment property in 1996 by Brian Kerr and his late brother, David Kerr. The property was registered in their names as joint tenants. The plaintiffs alleged that their intention was to hold it as tenants in common so that each brother’s interest would pass under his will.

When David Kerr died in 2017, the entire legal interest passed to Brian Kerr by survivorship. The plaintiffs alleged that, following David Kerr’s death, the operation of survivorship and any subsequent transfer intended to give effect to his testamentary wishes would give rise to significant tax consequences.

The conveyance had been handled by Finbar Cahill & Company, where the defendant, Martin Moran, was then a partner. The plaintiffs alleged that Martin Moran had personally handled the transaction, that the file later transferred to his own practice and that he failed to correct the title or advise the purchasers before David Kerr died.

Martin Moran denied that he had conducted the conveyance. He maintained that other solicitors within Finbar Cahill & Company had been responsible.

The application

The defendant sought to have the proceedings struck out without a full trial under Order 19 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction. He argued that the plaintiffs had sued the wrong party and that the claim was statute-barred. The application rested on two grounds.

First, the defendant argued that he was not responsible for the conveyance and that the proceedings had not been properly constituted against the correct defendant. He denied conducting the conveyance and maintained that Martin Moran & Company Solicitors, which began practising under that name in 2002, could not be liable for work undertaken by Finbar Cahill & Company in 1996.

The plaintiffs disputed that account. Brian Kerr maintained that Martin Moran was the only solicitor with whom he had dealt. He relied on correspondence signed by Martin Moran following completion and later correspondence relating to the storage of the title deeds.

Second, the defendant argued that the claim was statute-barred. The conveyance was completed in 1996, but the proceedings were not issued until April 2023. His position was that any breach and actionable loss arose when the property was acquired as a joint tenancy.

In response to the limitation defence, the plaintiffs alleged that there had been continuing failures to correct the title or provide appropriate advice up to 2017. They also relied on a disputed account of a meeting in August 2020, when Martin Moran was alleged to have attributed the joint tenancy to the mortgage provider’s requirements. He denied that account.

Why the application failed

The High Court was not satisfied that the proceedings could be properly disposed of summarily. The issue was not whether the plaintiffs were ultimately likely to succeed at trial, but whether the case could be determined without resolving material disputes of fact.

Those disputes included who had handled the conveyance, what instructions and advice were given, the significance and subsequent movement of the file, the alleged 2020 conversation and the significance of those matters to the limitation defence. They could not properly be resolved on affidavit evidence and might require discovery and oral evidence.

Importantly, the court did not endorse the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim. The judge referred expressly to its “obvious frailties” and made no final determination on limitation, the retainer, the correct defendant or liability. Those defences remained for trial.

Strategic considerations

The decision underlines the importance of considering whether the proposed ground of dismissal can properly be determined on the evidence already before the court.

A claim may appear factually weak but remain unsuitable for summary dismissal where the application would require the court to resolve conflicts of evidence, assess credibility or await discovery.

An unsuccessful strike-out application may also have costs and tactical consequences, including revealing aspects of the defence case at an early stage and giving the claimant an opportunity to address weaknesses exposed by the application.

Expert support

The judgment does not record whether the plaintiffs had obtained independent expert evidence on the standard of conveyancing practice in 1996, and the absence of such evidence did not form part of the strike-out application.

Whether expert evidence is required in a professional negligence claim will depend on the nature of the alleged breach. Where the issue concerns professional practice outside the court's ordinary knowledge, appropriately qualified expert evidence may be necessary. However, expert evidence cannot resolve underlying factual disputes such as the scope of the retainer, the instructions given or what was said in a disputed conversation.

The Court of Appeal's decision in McHale v McHale and others [2026] IECA 66 provides a recent illustration of the importance of obtaining necessary expert support before advancing allegations of professional negligence. In that case, the plaintiff accepted that expert evidence was necessary to support the proposed amendments but had not obtained it: Two Irish Court of Appeal decisions on pleading, proof and expert evidence

For insurers and their advisers, an early question should therefore be whether the pleaded allegations require expert support and, if so, whether an appropriately qualified expert has actually addressed the relevant standard and alleged breach. If that is unclear, particulars can be sought identifying the professional standard relied upon and the basis on which the insured is alleged to have fallen below it.

Doran v Quinn and Brady: Prolonged inactivity justifies dismissal

The plaintiff alleged that his former solicitors had been negligent in connection with his purchase of development land for €3 million in 2007. He claimed that the property was landlocked and unsuitable for development.

Proceedings were issued in 2013 but were subsequently left completely inactive for more than five years and eight months. The defendant solicitors applied to have the proceedings dismissed for delay and want of prosecution.

The High Court applied the approach established by the Supreme Court in Kirwan v Connors. That decision places greater emphasis on delay itself and on the obligation of a plaintiff to progress proceedings within a reasonable period.

A continuous period of inactivity exceeding five years placed the case within the most serious category identified in Kirwan v Connors. In that category, the passage of time was capable of justifying dismissal without proof of separate specific prejudice.  The likely need to resolve disputes about oral advice given in 2007 nevertheless reinforced the forensic difficulty created by the delay. See our previous legal insight: Strike out applications after Kirwan v Connors: Renewed judicial intolerance of delay

The plaintiff sought to explain the inactivity by relying on related proceedings involving Allied Irish Banks plc. The court rejected that explanation. No standstill had been agreed, and the defendant solicitors had not been informed that the professional negligence claim was being paused pending the outcome of the bank proceedings.

The existence of related litigation did not relieve the plaintiff of the obligation to prosecute the claim. The proceedings were dismissed.

Why the decision is significant

The decision is particularly significant for professional negligence claims, which often concern advice given many years earlier and depend heavily on evidence of oral discussions, instructions and professional judgment. The survival of the underlying file does not necessarily eliminate the forensic prejudice caused by delay. A file may not record every discussion, instruction or commercial consideration, and witnesses’ recollections may remain important.

Do not assume related proceedings create a standstill

Related litigation does not of itself suspend the obligation to progress a professional negligence claim. If the parties intend proceedings to be paused,  the arrangement should be recorded clearly,  with its scope, duration and review date specified.

Legal professionals should also keep dormant proceedings under regular review, recording the last substantive step, the period of inactivity, any explanation offered for the delay, whether the defendant has contributed to it and whether subsequent engagement could amount to acquiescence or otherwise affect a potential dismissal application.

Conclusion: Choose the right ground

These decisions demonstrate that identifying weakness in a professional negligence claim is not necessarily enough to secure its early dismissal.

In Kerr v Moran, the claim survived because the proposed grounds for dismissal depended on disputed facts requiring  further evidence. In Doran v Quinn and Brady, by contrast, more than five years and eight months of complete inactivity, without sufficient justification, provided a basis for dismissal.  

For solicitors and their professional indemnity insurers, the practical question is therefore not simply whether a claim appears weak, but whether the particular ground for bringing it to an end can properly be determined at that stage of the proceedings. 

Dormant claims require a different approach: procedural history should be monitored closely, any agreed standstill should be recorded expressly, and advice obtained before  steps are taken that could affect a potential dismissal application. 

The distinction is simple but important: a weak claim may survive; a dormant claim need not.

 

Further Reading